Abstract. As a member of the British Commonwealth, South Africa was part of Britain
a very real possibility. South Africa was ill-prepared for war, but the government was adamant that the country would fully cooperate with its friends and associates in the British Commonwealth. Immediate measures to expand and mechanize the Army and improve the capacity of the Air Force were put in place and by December 1939 the Mobile Field Force of the UDF had been formed and was being trained and mobilized (Orpen & Martin 1981:16) . It was clear that, should Italy enter the war, Italian forces operating from Eritrea and Abyssinia would pose a real threat to Allied shipping in the Red Sea, and that Germany would support an Italian invasion of Kenya. As a precautionary measure, the Union Defence Force (UDF) sent several reconnaissance parties to Nairobi to report on local conditions. One of the important issues which was investigated, was the level of surveying and topographical mapping in north-east Africa.
The probable area in East Africa over which operations were expected to take place, was a large one. The Italian possessions formed a solid block of territory with an area of over 1 000 000 sq miles extending from the border between Kenya and Italian East Africa in the south, to the northern boundary of Eritrea, and from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in the west, to the Indian Ocean, British Somaliland, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea in the east (see Figure 1 ). Very little of this area had been properly surveyed, and there were large tracts for which little cartographic information was available. The most up-to-date published maps of Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was Figure 1 . The war zone in north-east Africa a 1 : 400 000 Italian series which was on public sale in places such as Mogadishu, but of which only a few sheets had been secured prior to the war. By 1939 the only available War Office maps of East Africa were the 1 : 2 000 000 standard African series covering the whole of East Africa; a 1 : 1 000 000 series of Tanganyika, southern and north-western Kenya, and Uganda, but without any coverage of Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland; and a 1 : 250 000 series comprising 17 sheets covering British Somaliland (Clough 1952: 151) .
With the existing maps being totally inadequate for a military campaign fought with modern warfare, the immediate mapping of East Africa became a matter of the utmost urgency. With the resources of the local East African Survey Company in Nairobi severely limited, it was obvious that South Africa would have to take a leading role in providing the necessary topographical information and maps for military purposes.
Background
When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the country had no central mapping organisation and was virtually unmapped except for a few compilation map series produced by the British forces during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 (Liebenberg 1974) . After the War, the British War Office mapped the Orange River Colony at a scale of 1 : 125 000, and the north-western Cape Colony at a scale of 1 : 250 000, but almost no mapping was done after that. When the UDF was established in 1912, South Africa was entirely dependent upon the British War Office for its intelligence (Van der Waag 1995: 22) . This was still the situation in 1914 when the country was subjected to a threatening invasion of German South West Africa, and was also called upon to assist in the defense of East Africa. After World War I, the South African engineering units which served in German South West Africa and East Africa were disbanded (Clough 1952: 8) .
When the South African Trigonometrical Survey Office (TSO) was established in 1921, its first priority was not mapping, but the completion of the primary and secondary triangulation network of the country. The country remained unmapped for both military and civilian purposes until 1936 when the situation became so untenable that a high-level decision was taken by the government that the TSO should undertake the mapping of the country on a scale of 1 : 50 000 using aerial photography (Liebenberg 1974: 334-344 
Mapping policy
In July 1940, and again in November 1940, the following mapping policy decisions regarding East Africa were announced by the Director of Survey of the Middle East operational area (Clough 1952: 153-155 ):
• The existing 1 : 2 000 000 War Office series (GSGS 2871), would remain the standard map series of Africa with the Union of SA undertaking the maintenance and printing of all sheets south of latitude 4º N.
• The existing 1 : 1 000 000 series (GSGS 2465), which covered Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda had to be extended to Abyssinia and Somaliland as far north as 8º N. The responsibility for this series would lie with the East African Survey Group (EASG) which was instructed to mainly concentrate on the area of potential operations and movement.
• A 1 : 500 000 series, which was to consist of sheets compiled on a regular system of sheet lines measuring 2º each way, covering the whole battle area, would be the standard series for the operational area. The series was to be based on surveys of accessible areas, reconnaissance reports and other map material that could be obtained. Special features were to be photographed from the air.
• A 1 : 250 000 series of the more developed areas was to be undertaken by 1 SA Survey Company.
• Maps on scales of 1 : 50 000 and 1 : 25 000 of selected areas were to be produced by making use of rapid air surveys by 60 SA Air Photographic Squadron.
To fully understand the complexity of the mapping effort envisaged, it is necessary to move forward in time and provide a brief summary of the military operations which took place during the period August 1940 until the Italian East African Army finally surrendered in May 1941.
Abyssinian Campaign
As from June 1940, Italy tested the resolve of the British and Commonwealth forces in north-east Africa. To reach the border between Kenya and Abyssinia, and Kenya and Somaliland, the South African and East African forces had to cross Kenya's formidable North Frontier District, a dry and barren wasteland comprising two deserts; namely the one the soda-sand desert of the Chalbi stretching northwest of Marsabit, and the other the uninhabitable lava desert, the Dida Galgalla, running north to the Moyale escarpment. With the average daily temperature well in excess of 110 °F and no surface water, water supply was a vital problem resulting in each soldier receiving only two gallons of water per day for personal use. It was in such circumstances that 36 SA Water Supply Company of the SAEC rendered an heroic service to the Allied forces by drilling water holes and pumping water day and night to keep the military operation going (Orpen & Martin 1981: 40, 129-130) . The war was not over yet. After their defeat by General Platt at the Battle of Keren, the remnants of the Italian Eritrean army had fallen back to the south-east towards Dessie and Amba Alagi where they would link up with the defeated armies fleeing north from Addis Ababa. In the mean time the Emperor of Abyssinia, Haile Selassie, who had lived in exile in Britain since 1936, had returned to his country via the Sudan and had collected a motley army of brigands and rebels, called the "Shifta", which was now also marching on Addis Ababa and the Italians strongholds at Amba Alagi and Gondar.
The two fiercest battles the South Africans would fight during the entire campaign were in the mountain maze of Dessie and Amba Alagi north of Addis Ababa. Towering 10 000 ft into the sky, the peak of Amba Alagi was surrounded by a tumbled maze of mountains and ravines which, in May 1941, were enveloped by biting winds, rain, mist and sleet. On 18 May 1941, after fifteen days of tenacious attack by British, Indian and South African troops, the Duke of Aosta, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian East African Army, formally surrendered. The rain season postponed the final reduction of some Italian garrisons which had taken refuge in ancients forts in the mountain country of north-west Abyssinia, but on 27 November 1941 General Nasi, the last of the Italian commanders in the field, surrendered the fortress at Gondar. The war in Abyssinia had ended.
Apart from 1 SA Survey Company, the other SAEC companies also rendered invaluable services throughout the campaign. The SA Water Supply Company drilled wells, built water installations and lay pipelines in the dry, desert areas of the south whilst the Water Maintenance Company treated large quantities of poor quality water to make it potable. The Road Construction and Road Maintenance Companies built roads and passes in rocky and mountainous areas and lay pontoon bridges; the Railway Companies built railway lines for the transport of military equipment and troops; and the Field Sections cleared sites for camps; built base camps and field hospitals; built airstrips and landing grounds, and cleared roads of land mines. The SAEC on the whole, performed prodigious feats in all theatres of the campaign. 
Organisational structure

The 60 Photographic Squadron, SAAF
The size of the potential battle area and the fact that the surveyors could only work to a very limited extent in enemy territory, made it apparent from early on that air survey methods would be of the utmost importance. In June 1940 the task to photograph large areas of East Africa for mapping purpose fell to 1 Survey (Flight) of 60 Photographic Squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF). The operational instructions given to this Flight were to take photographs of the areas required by the Survey Directorate, to develop the films and to produce contact prints which were then handed over to the Photo-Topo Sections of the EASG and 1 SA Survey Company. Personnel of the Squadron were attached to the latter unit to form a photo developing and printing section. With only a few aircraft and limited resources to their disposal, the pilots, ground staff and photographic personnel produced valuable and urgently required photography on an ongoing basis (Clough 1981: 144-145) .
Activities of Groups and Sections
Commanded by Major John Short, 1 SA Survey Company comprised the following groups (Visick ca. 1945?: 6) :
Five sections of 1 SA Survey Company operated in the field, each consisting of four officers, 12 other ranks and 20 to 30 African labourers. In addition to these, survey parties were also attached to the 1 st South African Division and the 25 th EA Infantry Brigade at Marsabit. The operational orders to the Field Sections were to continue the existing Kenya primary triangulation northwards into south-eastern Abyssinia to be connected to the Uganda triangulation, if time permitted; to establish a secondary and minor triangulation network to provide control points for artillery purposes and subsequent aerial photographic surveys; to map large areas by ground methods (plane tabling) for road building and other infrastructure purposes; to check the topography on existing captured maps; to prepare sketch maps from aerial photographs, and to maintain the records of the surveys undertaken (see Figure 3) . The triangulation required thorough reconnaissance excercises, night observing to attain good visibility (no mirage or glare) and stable conditions (no wind), baseline measurement, and beacon building. Many points were inaccessible by vehicles and necessitated long safaris on foot through dense bush, and over boulder-covered ground. The lack of water was an ongoing problem, and a certain amount of bush cutting was necessary to clear lines of sight. The plane table mapping was done on a scale of 1 : 100 000 with contour intervals of 250 ft, and it was required to fix the position of all roads, buildings, villages, boreholes, permanent water holes and military positions. The country was generally difficult to access as large areas were covered by an extensive lava sheet consisting of jagged and loose boulders in an endless series of shallow hollows and mounds.
The information collected by the surveyors in the field was passed on to the Photo-Topo and Map Production sections which were responsible for the transfer of topographical information from aerial photographs to plane tables, and for the actual compilation and fair drawing of the maps. The members of the SA Photo-Topo Group were mostly drawn from the staff of the TSO in South Africa and were therefore trained in topographical work. 1 The Map Production Group consisted of volunteers from various government departments and municipal and private drawing offices in the Union. Although trained draughtsmen, they had very little mapping experience and no knowledge of reproductive methods used in cartography. After being trained in map production methods, they worked in shifts of 10 hours on and 20 hours off, and produced roughly 3,5 maps per day. Every effort was made to issue maps at least one jump ahead of the troops, but movement was so rapid that it sometimes became necessary to stop work on those maps of an area already covered, to jump ahead of the troops once more.
Map reproduction was concentrated in Nairobi throughout the campaign (McGrath 1976: 100) . The EA Survey Group had a hand-operated map printing plant to its disposal to which additional equipment was supplied in October 1940 from the Middle East command. In the Union of South Africa the lithographic printing of peace-time topographical maps was not, as in most other countries, undertaken by the TSO, but by the Government Printer. On mobilization, the Government Printer became the UDF Director of Army Printing and Stationery Supplies (DAP & SS). The DAP & SS soon formed a Mobile Printing Company which in 1940 was moved to Nairobi to be attached to 1 SA Survey Company. The printing work was divided between the EASG and 1 SA Survey Company, and although some sheets were compiled, drawn and printed by only one of these units, many were compiled and drawn by the one, and printed by the other.
Maps produced
1 SA Survey Company was involved in the production of the following map series:
8.1 East Africa 1 : 500 000 series Due to the shared responsibilities, the Second or Third Edition of a sheet which was issued by a particular unit, was later often done by the alternative unit with a corresponding change in appearance. After May 1941, the 1 : 500 000 series became the sole responsibility of the EASG.
As most maps had to be compiled from information collected by the field sections and whatever other sources were available, many sheets depict a "realiability diagram" announcing that "This map is compiled from the best available information. Surveys on the ground have not been made and the map may be unreliable". Some sheets, however, show reliability diagrams giving more exact information regarding the actual sources used (see Figures 5A and 5B).
A B Figure 5
A: Reliability diagram of 1 : 500 000 sheet GABREDARRE B: Reliability diagram of 1 : 500 000 sheet NEGHELLI The 1 : 500 000 maps of East Africa produced by 1 SA Survey Company were published in either 3 or 4 colours. As South Africa was still unmapped at that stage, the style and appearance of the maps resemble the South Figure 7 . Sheets of the Africa 1 : 2 000 000 series produced and printed in South Africa South Africa honoured its undertaking to maintain and print the sheets pertaining to GSGS 2871 south of 4ºN. This task involved a complete revision and redrawing of the existing maps by the TSO (see Figure 7 which depicts an area on the sheet UPPER CONGO). The South African maps were published as UDF 656 (see 
Gazetteer
In May 1941, 1 SA Survey Company was moved to the Middle East with all its equipment and personnel, including the attached lithographic section. Before leaving Nairobi, the Company had completed a gazetteer for use with the 1 : 500 000 map series. The gazetteer contained over 23 000 place names, for which grid references were provided. The compilation took approximately 3 000 man-hours in addition to a further 600 man-hours for subsequent checking.
Conclusion
In 
